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ASPECTS 01'i. THE .b:CONOMIC MOTIVATION

BEHIND THB MARSHALL PLAN

Yet, in a larger context, in which government officials
defined peace in terms of international prosperity and
viewed domestic prosperity as dependent in the long run
upon the international economy, Americans were also accepting .short-run economic risks for long-run economic
gains. It is in this framework that the Williams thesis
merits closer examination for its judgment of the aims
of interest groups in the postwar period •

.Barton J. Bernstein,

"~conomic\Policies"

Richard S.

\\

in

Kirk~ndall,

ed.,

The Truman P~·ri6d .§:.Q a Research Field,
(University of rUssouri, 1967).
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.I. Introduction: The Truman Doctrine as an Anticipation of

.the Marshall Plan.

At least one of the phases of the Cold War, the Truman Doctrine - Marshall Plan period, seems to offer the student a framework that is relatively easy to grasp, if only in a superficial way. The instrumants of these actions, the political-military
and the economic, are so neatly complenentary to each other that it
looks as though events had conspired to structure the different
needs and objectives of the foreign policy in·an intelligible way.
Soon a!'ter the end of the Second \forld Warf the Un5.1.f-H1. St.ates
was faced with a situation that was radically different from what
had been experienced after the First World War. Once the balance
among the European powers had been restored in 1918, the United
States had been able to withdraw its military forces, confident that
the scale was tipped in favor of orderly.conduct of international
affairs.
This retreat was not to be repeated after 1945. The Second
World War had left the European count.erweight to communist expansion in a state of devastation and despair so profound that it took
several years before the destruction of Western Europe in its
political, military, and economic aspects was fully realized in the
.

,

United States.
It turned out that whereas American power in 1917 and
I

- 5 -

by design, had been taken over by the United States, was in itself
a process of several stages. The Postdam Conference had shown that
President Truman had not irrevocably accepted a communist domination
of Eastern Europe;

H~roshima

had signified that whatever the charac-

ter of the American intentions, they we-re backed by a-military pot-:-

ential which even surpassed the economic and industrial prependerance of American power.
In th:i.s context, the Truman Doctrine stands out as an inte:r·lm
climax of the American awareness of its new global role. In the
spring of 1947, Communist, leftist, and anti-monarchial forces in
Greece seemed to be able to overcome the. Greek government which had
been backed by British military since the German withdrawal in 1944.
The function Greece had been supposed to play in a pacified Europe.
was at stake. To this came the Soviet pressure on Turkey, where the

•

•
·claims to strategic control of the Straits
of the Fardanelles had

been renewed. The British domination of the Eastern Mediterranean
seemed in jeopardy until President Truman on March.12, 1947, formally
promised to take over the British obligations as he launched the
Truman Doctrine.
;

However, the British failure in Greece was ea:rly understood as
I

.

·~

- 6 lln indication which pointed to the general situaJion in Western
0

"

.Europe. From the early spring fl947, State Department planners had
carried out research on the problems of European revival. On June 5,
q,

1 g47~

Secretary of State, George Marshall, promised American action for

curing

the patient, along with the .efforts for a neutralization of

symptoms. While the Truman Doctrine relied basically on

immed~ate

military support to Greece and Turkey, the Marshall Plan employed
economic means for a general recovery of Western Europe which would
help tocheck the growth of comnunism.
The degree .to which the Truman Doctrine anticipated the Marshall
Plan was indicated in the speech of

Marc~

12, in which Truman told

Congress that he "believed that our help should be primarily through
economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability
and orderly political processes." 1 Another of the basic assumptions,
which served as a main argument in support of the Marshall Plan,
was revealed in the conception of a "militant minority exploiting
human want and misery, •.• @.nql able to create a political chaos which
..• makes economic recovery impossible. 112 Furthermore, the close relationship between the doctrine and the p1an is testified to by
George Kennan, author of one of the planning papers which had a decisive influence on the launching of the program of European recovery.
The paper erided with a plea that an effort be made in connection with
1 Public· Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1947, (Wash-,.
ington, D.C., 1962),""J?. 179, (hereaf~er Truman Papers: 1947).

- 7 the i d ea

of a .6uropean recovery program, to correct "what seemed to

o be some of the main misinterpretationsthat had been created
us t

in connection with the Truman Doctrine."

3

President Truman himself

stated that the doctrine and the Marshall Plan "are two halves of
the same walnut," an unavoidable cliche' in any consideration of this

.

period.

4

If, however, the Truman Doctrine and the European Recovery
Program (ERP) have to be regarded as a unit, the question arises of
which is the pea and which is the shell of American foreign policy
of this period. What is form and what is content, and what might be
considered rhetorical devices ''to scare the hell out of the Anerican
people " ? 5 Even if it is generally agreed upon that the doctrine was
basically military, while the Marshall Plan was economic, the ques-

more conspicuous. What was primarily at stake? The democratic in-

stitutions of Greece and Turkey or the strategic and economic interests in the

~astern

part of the Mediterranean Sea? Was the pur-

pose to help the starving people in Western Europe

survive? Was

it to save them from subversive communist fore es? Or was it perhaps

to secure stable Darkets for export and investment? Did the Americans
offer their help in order to secure peace abroad or rather in order

3
George 1''. Kerman,

~for:10irs,

(I~cnr

York, 1967), p.
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to preven t social and economic upheaval at home? Should American intervention be regarded as a crusade for peace or as a campaign for
comm e ~~ce and export? In case these questions should. be complementar.y
0

to each other, the issue arises f how these different motives were tied
up 1·n the ideology of political economy and in the relationship between

domestic and foreign policy.
Put in this way, it is evident that any answer to the questions
above will attempt to touch upon problems which are basic not only

to the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan but to the context in
which these actions appeared as episodes: the outbreak of the Cold
War. Perhaps even broader: the motivating forces and the basic as-

sumptions of American diplomacy in the age of postindustrial corporate capitalism.

ll·

The "Healist" and the "Revisionist" Approach to the
Marshall Plan

The central importance of the Marshall Plan, for a proper understanding of the themes of the Cold War, has increasingly attracted
attention. Two mainstreams of investigation can be outlined; to Gome
degree,both cf them seem to correspond to different climates of
opinion.
Until the late fifties, the literature on: the ~farsh:::i 11 PJ_ c:i.:!: 1·!::.~
dominated by authors of the "academic-realist" school. With George
F. Kennan and Hans Morgenthau as its most widely known spokesmen,
this school relied on a concept of power politics as the proper basis
for the conduct of foreign policy. This approach to contemporary
political issues was an offshoot of a similar approach to history in
general.
With the recent experiences of Nazi Geroany in clear memory, the
academic realists developed their theory of international relations
on the assumption of an inherent aggresfJivenecs of states. The desire

for maximation of power, which circur1scribed this conception of
national int<.;rest, constituted a set of principles according to which
it was pos~-;i ble to culculate act:Lons
and reactions in foreir;n affairs.

- 10 . obstacle to a rational conduct of international politics was
A main
· the intrusion of public opinion into the decision making
found in
process.
'A._: good deal of our trouble seems to have stemmed from the extent to which the executive has felt itself beholden to short
term trends of public opinion in this country and from what
we might call the erratic and subjective nature of public reaction to foreign-policy questions.l

The presence of public opinion in the formulation of foreign
relations signified to the academic realists

interference of an ir-

rational and highly incalculable factor which tended to break down
the distinction between domestic and foreign policy, and hence, confuse the game of competing interests which

wa~3

best handled by

trained experts who knew the proper rules. The involvement of the
public had made the environment of states unstable and vacillating,
because

concep~s

of individual law had been carried over into the

international field and legalistic ideas had been associated with
moralistic ones: "the assumption
2
ject for moral judgement."

that state behavior is a fit

sub-

The intent behind this theory was twofold. First it was highly
programmatic i.n its call for "professionalism" to substitute for the
current "diplomacy of dillettantisrn". 3 Secondly, it constituted a
critical approach to the history of American diplomacy. In the case
1

p. 81.

George :F. Kennan, American Diplomacy 1900-1950, (Chicago, 1951),

21bid. p.
87.

---

3Ib. 1
-1:.S.· 1) • Ell.

"

~
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of

the Marshall Plan, both aspects converged. On the one hand, the

BRP was favored as an expression of liberal principles and pragmatic
planning.
the wrong

on the other hand, the Marshall Plan had been adopted for
reasons. As Morgenthau described the motivation for the

plan:
The issue of military and econooic assistance to Western Europe
presented itself primarily not.as.a question of national ii:iterest, but as one of moral principle, of selfless generosity.
Such aid was defended as a mandate from America's humanitarian
past, it was opposed in terms of the unworthiness of the recipients and of the sacrifices it imposed upon the giver.4
Considered as an historical account, serious objections can be
raised against this interpretation, as this paper hopes to point
out. But also from a more theoretical point of view, this approach
seems open to criticism.
The assumption of the fundamental aggressiveness of nations,
which must be deterred by the aggressiveness of other nations, appears
to be a self-assuring rationale. Expectations of aggression tend in themto promote responses, which might insure aggression, even

~elves

where no offenses were intended from the onset. Hence, the prophecy
fulfills itself .5 Secondly, the relationship between public opinion
and foreign affairs wm> hardly as simple ·as assumed by the academic
realists. While it remains true that a public outburst of emotion
may at times endanGer short-range policies nnd jeopardize the
4,i
.t

arrn J.

1951), p. 122.

'

JVlorgentho..u, In Defense of National Interest, (Hew York,

-

.Lt::

-

,,..,. ational system, scholars have pointed out that the Truman ad. intern

. . tration had effective means at its disposal with which to in-

1111n1s

e or manipulate public opinion. Furthermore, the influence of
flu en C
been
the bureaucracy now seems to have significant to the point where
governrr]ent agencies were able to plan and pursue policies of their
own with only a minimum of interference from the president
lie opinion.

01~

pub-

6

With its emphasis on containment instead of crusade, on a rational conception of national interest instead of crusading fervor,
the academic realism seems, in retrospect, in itself to signify one
of the stages of the development of an autonomous bureaucracy within
the order of the military-industrial complex. Although some were
influential commentators, it is striking how many of the academic
+i,,o
l, ~.... .....

,..,;;;i;;i,,...
.. ........... , .._

·-<- -·- ,.,,,.

or

~ppc~

0chelon2

the establishment of the agencies of official or semi-official foreign
policy. On this background, the advocacy of professionalism and expertise suggests the development of a self-conscious status group.

A characteristic that was common for the criticism of the liberal realists was the unwillingness to question the basic assumptions behind the Cold War tension. Hepresentative in this respect
lere

Herbert Feis' contemporary writings. Like Kennan, Feis had been

active during the war in the planning of postwar foreign policy.
Throughout the forties, }'eis advocated a more conscious use of Ameri-

can economic power:
6 .
Kirkendall,
/

h.

- l3 It would also be useful if agreement could be reached ••• under
which, with proper safeguards and limitations, the natural resources of dependent areas were opened to the qualified capital
and enterprise of all friendly countries. The extention of the
open door remains a sound American aim.7
To Feis it was a basic principle to attempt to stabilize American
economic development through actions "to relieve the needs of others,
to provide aid in the development of their resources, and to protect
118 The recipient nations, however,
our fu ture by investing in theirs.

had to pledge faith in the principles of liberal trade. As Feis expressed it:
Nations must qualify for economic aid, and cooperate by acting
as reliable members of a peaceful international society. The
advances of states of uncertain nature should be regarded with
caution .•.• For the "Devil sick" and the "Devil well" continue
to be two different principles.9
While these ideas obviously carry a

cent~al

importance for an

understanding of the policy of the Ilarshall l)lan, they also shed
light on Feis's more recent writings whicb stand out more as an accumulation of isolated facts

as an interpretation of the mean-

th~n

ing of the events. In view uf this background,

:Rt~eis'

neglect of

dealing with the world view of the American policy-makers seems to
indicate that he has internalized their'world outlook to such a
7

Herbert Fe is, "Bconomics and Peace," l''ond.gn Folicv Henort,
Vol. XX, no. 2, (1944), p. 17.
8

*

Ib'd ., p. 14.
___]:__

9

Ibid., p. 18. Feis repeated these ideas iJn 1950 in Diplomacv
i.~ 1Jol1<:t:r, a stri~dng pa~·allel to Kem.ian' s book about J\meri_can
thplor~~- next :yeo.r. Hero F~~s mwle ~1 delJ.berate at~ompt to C1PJ)ly
e e:xi.·81Jf'Y1C
of
the>
i'·"'~·11ioc•
+ci t·ne DO<'tT·"'Y'
·fortJf'<'
t.:_, ,.)
• .
.
,..
I \ V 1,:,... J •
\'l Col,.. L
•• \...
.
• ·"'
~~

0

'·'

J
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that he lost the ability to analyze it.

10

The most recent argument of the academic realists has been ford by Robert Tucker. Admitting that radical critique has shed
mula t e
light on the outbreak of the Cold War, Tucker nevertheless retreated

to the old proposition of the inevitability of conflict between the
supe rp

owers. "What state that achieved the power and eminence America

achieved by the end of World War II has not wanted and sought to
have the world evolve in an equilibrium favorable to it?

1111

Denying

American foreign policy both the disinterestedness and the innocence
claimed previously by liberal historians, Tucker confirmed that imperial or imperialistic intentions were dominant in the sixties. The
question was when these aspirations became predominant. Applied to
Europe, the conventional security interest justified the early policy
of cont!1.:Lnment wt-ii 0.h

w::;i..c;

11

l'11nT'e

or ] P8S synonymous with a balance-of-

power policy. 11 12 The shift of attention from security to j_rnperialism
should be placed

11

somewhere in the middle to late fifties 11 or at

11

the

time of the Cuban missile crisis, 11 when it became no longer plausible

to equate the expansion of comnmnism with the expansion of Soviet or
Chinese power. 13
1

°Feis is sometimes excluded from the ranks of academic realism.
(For instance, Kirkendall, Truman Period, p. 18). In the end this is
only a matter of tcrrainology. It does r~ot seem unreasonable to discard the criterion of active criticism and instead place the emphasis
on the question of the ultimate inevitability of the outbreak of the
Cold War. For a discussion of Feis' opinion, see Gar Alperovitz,
QQ.ld Wa_E ~~ys, (New York, 1970), p. 7-12, C. Lasch' s introduction.
lL{

(

1 olJert W. Tucker, The Radical Left and 11.merican Foreign policy,
Baltinw:re' 1971)' p. 9~'3.
--·---

121

--.1?1.sl. '

p. 10<'.3.

/

~

-

l.? -

Of special interest is the analysis of the Truman Doctrine. To
it was an expression of an interventionism based on security
TUcker,
.derations. Hence, the imperialistic implications\ which radical
con S 1
critique tended to read into the document, were examples of the
"habit of emphasizing statements that appear to support the view of
turB of conviction [about the necessity for expansion abroad]
the na
·
those that do not." 14 Pointing out that the doctrine
and ignorine;

"did not identify freedom with capitalism, nor did it declare that

all freedom is dependent upon freedom of enterprise," Tucker read
the Truman Doctrine "almost entirely in libertarian and political
. terms ;1 as opposed to the radical critique that stressed the economic

implications of the doctrine.

15

With this view 1 Tucker seems to reveal the basic weakness of his

mitment "to assist free people to work out their own destinies in
their own way" is startling, as Truman, less than a week before 1 at

defined the meaning of these key concepts of
historical document can be understood separately from its context, and

.§:.

m:;:iori to dismiss the connota tionsy

Which provide the general meaning of an abstract expression, is un, likely to result in significant conclusions. J<'urthermore, it is ob~· Vious that the doctrine was designed for a broader Dcene than the

13

15

Tucker, Radig~l Left, p. 110.

Ib"d
--b·,
p. G:i.

r
.

.
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t domestic. For the question of the motivation behind the statement,
the important thing is to attempt to determine the content of these
" expressions, which in themselves appear quite meaningless. This can
only be made

if the contemporary context as well as the way the

statement was perceived in the United States

is ·carefully examJned.

The academic realists regardErlthe outbreak of the Cold War as
an inevitable event, and hence, they seemed to refuse to take up the
study of the assumptions which made the Cold War appear inescapable
in the middle of the forties. Likely, their difficulties stem from
the fact that this school was actively engaged in the formulation
of this policy and that the then outlook has been internalized to
the point where it is no longer a matter of conscious reflection.
However, it appears from the vantage point of the seventies that the
disasters of the foreign policy point out the increasing irrelevance
.of an approach to diplomacy which deals only with the options and
never with the basic world view.
It is his bold and perceptive analysis of the underlying assumptions that puts William

Apple~an

Williams in a position to offer

an explanation that brings perspective and coherence to the conduct '
of foreign affairs. This interpretation is related to American
Marxi?t tradition. 16

In his book from 1959, Williams attempted to prove that American
diplomacy since the turn of .the century }lad been

g.etermin~d

primarily

by the economic demands of.the world capitalist system. The postwar
;

16 w1111km Appleman Williams, The~Tragedy of American Diplomacy,
Revised and enlarged edition, (Bant~m, New York, 1961[.

- 17 was molded upon these needs. "Open-door expansion, it apdiploroacY
was the answer to all problems - the Russians, markets and
peare d '
materials. 1117 The \fol tanschauung, which was reflected in the open-

raw ...

door concept was based on an economic definition of the world. At the
World War II, it consisted of three aspects which explained
end Of
the policy of containment and were its rationale. The first viewed
Russia as being "evil but weak". The second defined the United States
as the symbol and aeent of positive good and hence of moral superio-

rity, as opposed to Soviet evil. The third aspect of the open-door
outlook was "the fear that America's economic system would suffer
a serious depression if it did not continue to expand overseas," because forces inherent in the very nature of the capitalist system

serve the institutions of the social and political fabric at home. 18
In addition to the analysis of the basic assumptions behind. the

Marshall Plan policy, ·rlilliams drew attention to certain economic

features which explained why the plan was launched at this particular
moment. To Williams "it would be a grave error to evaluate or interpret the diplomatic moves of 1945 and 1946 in an economic vacuum,"
because the policy of the open-door "evolved concurrently with deep
concern over the econooic affairs in the United States." At the end
Of 1946,

11

an jncreaning concern over America's 'stagf,ering' consump-

tion and \'m.ste of D::tterials" appeared. In andi tion to this' the

268.

II""'"

r,,

'-

J>residen

18 -

t'" Council of Economic Advisers expressed in early 1947
i:J

about the probabili:ty of a serious economic slump." At the
•concern
~
ti·me Western Europe failed to recover from the. war and take
sallle
'
19
in the international economy.
In short, the Marshall
its place
rved economic ends, both in the short run, by removing the
5e

Plan

threa t

of falling exports in a contracting situation, and in the long

run, by building up potential markets. Both considerations were de-

fined by the attempt to secure a world order congenial to the needs

of the capitalist system.
Based on Williams' suggestion of the need to examine the basic
assumptions behind the Marshall Plan, this paper is an attempt to

examine, first, the economic situation in the United States in the

second, the way the

ERP

affected the contemporary debate over issues

of foreign policy. An answer to these questions might make it posSible to outline, thirdly, some of the basic economic assumptions

which were expressed in the long range mo ti va ti on for the program, -

that is, to attempt to uncover the underlying economic objectives of
the Marshall Plan and to investigate the concepts that defined the
national interest.

-·

19 .
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The Marshall Plan in A:r.J.erican Politics

Americans were faced by the

At the beginning of 1947,

astonishing fact "that the peacetime economy can not only equal

our war time economy but can surpass it."

1

Already for 1946 as a

whole, production was 50 percent over the prewar peacetime level
and only

15 percent under the wartime peak. The annual rates of the

last quarter v-;ere

e~vTen

a·bove the \1artimc

hir~h,

dccpi tc

"bottle::-~

necks, shortages of materials and components, labor-management disputes and other reconversion difficulties with retarding influence. 112
By midyear,

1947, most of the remnants of the reconversion problems

were cleared away and production had reached the annual rate of

~

225 billion. Americans 11ere ea ting more food per ca pi ta. than any

previous yea~and they were supplied with more goods and services

than ever before.3
1

Pr

Truman Pape_rs: 1947, p. 211.

2
. U • S • , Congress, Senate and House, The Economic Eenort of the

i9:~iden..t_, Transr:d. tted to the Congress, Jan. 8, 1947, \fashin,o;ton,
. ' P • 1, and app. 8, table VIII, (hereafter Bconor:lic neport).
7

the p...>u • ~ ·' Congrer3s, 0erwte and House t llid,yGCJI'. Bconomic neport of

~

jl'.

-

re"llder·~1

·-~-~,

J.ransr~;Jct.c:d

I''

•4

to

c on{')'eG~~,<uly
. ;
r·
'
21,
1947, \'1ashington,
I
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ThiS

unprecedented production was followed by an unemployment

was stable at the absolute minimum for an economy under. Arate that
readjustment. At the end of 1946, more than 10 million de,Oj,ng
·zed veterans and several other millions of wartime workers
90b il1

)&ad been

swallowed by the consumer producing industry without much

'tJ'OUble· In June, 1947, civilian employment was held at the record

ievel of 60 million while unemployment throughout 194 7 was as low
4
.... 1 . 5 to 2. 3 mi·11·ion.
The rise of production had, of course, to be balanced by a corresponding rise in purchasing power. The Bmployment Act of 1946 had

clearly revealed that Congress as well as the administration centered their evonomic policy around the integration and interdepen4ence of employment, production, and purchasing power. Since 1929,
the average income had, at the raiddle of 194 7, risen from 654 to

1090 in fixed prices. In the fourth quarter of 1947, the annual rate
ot national income had reached a total of more than
this meant that each person, on the average
~se

~

200 billion.

had received an in-

of more than 32 percent in power to buy goods and services

at the current price level. 5
On this background, l)resident Truman seemed justified when he
two first economic reports to Congress vdth optimistic
~

•tatements ·· "A merica
·
h as never been· so strong nor so prosperous.

lor have

OUT r~lY'QSYJ8Ct.~
1
~

b· een 1)r1gn
. ' t

er. "

6 C
.
1 y,
orrespon d ing

mi,
~

1\J
~

Econoraic Hepori);
19 4 7 ' p • 11-· l 5 .
cT C1l'l

•

b ' J/) 4 7 ' 'p . 7 ;

Yor.._
k
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stated in an editorial on New Year's Day, 1947, that the pre-

S

~
among businessmen was that any recession in business
_u.ing view
activity

would be comparatively small and shortlived and would in

7
clear the way for a prolonged period of general prosperity.
aD1 case
One danger, however, threatened the miracle of reconversion.

•one

cloud is shadowing our economic future," as the President put

it• "That cloud is caused by the sharp and rapid rise in prices.

118

])Ile to pent-up demand, left over from the wartime savings, as well as

to the general increase in income, demand outbalanced supply to such
a degree that the sellers were in total command of the market. After
price-control had been abandoned by Congress against the veto of the

President in the middle of 1946, prices had skyrocketed. In April,

1947, wholesale prices of textiles were 39 percent above the 1945
level, of farm products 40 percent, of building materials 51 percent,
and of food

53 percent higher than in 1945. 9

This rise in prices exceeded by far the rise in personal income,
and hence, caused the real purchasing power of the consumer's dollar

to decline more than eight percent in the same period. Thus, in 1947,
the increase in domestic consumption ouhTeighed the increase in in-

1lOme by more than 3. 5 billion. But in spite of a cash surplus in the
6.,

~conomic

Pe)')+
J an . 8 , io47
1. I ' r l~ ,
;1
,
p . 1 - 2_ an d p . 1113
•

7
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budget, purchasing power was still ample in the middle of
because of wartime saving, expansion of credit, and
f present saving rates. Furthermore, loans and emergency
reduction 0
countries in Burope and Asia sustained exports, and hence,
aid to
"buted to the fast absorption of production. In the second
contri
f 1947, the prices seemed at last to gain a little more
quarter o
though the combined domestic and foreign demands still
stabili.t y,
10
exerted an upward pressure. Even before the Marshall Plan brought the problems of foreign

demands and purchasing power into focus, Truman stressed the im. portance of export trade as "vital to the maintenance of a dynamic
domestic econor.ay." Proposing an expansion of overseas investments "in
tile first instance as an immediate outlet for goods and services,

~

American development of overseas resources as "a means of per-

manently increasing foreign markets for our farmers and business881101111

But on the other hand, Truman judged the current problems as
being mainly of doDestic origin, stressing
the maladjustments of
'
-

prices and wages as the primary reason for the heavy inflationary
tendency of the economic situation. Accordingly, his short range
:recommendatiom~ dealt exclusively with domestic prices while the

long range advice for the economic development emphasized the

-

10.,

.t<.,conorn_i_c:_ Fenort, July 21, 1947, p. 9..r..12 and p. 47.
11
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·on of export as the principal means of sustaining the peace'•Jpa.nsl.
12
\iJne economy·
The tendency to contrast long range considerations for expanof foreign markets with short range concern for the domestic

8 1on

development of inf:lation was further underlined when Truman, on

Jlarch 19, 1947, asked Congress for an extension of export control.
One of Truman's reasons was undoubtedly his desire to make use of

the export trade for the sake of diplomatic advantages in dealing

with other

n~tions.

But the main cause was his preoccupation with

the domestic supply and price structure. Thus, "unrestrained. export
would inevitably limit the level of our own industrial production
and eroployment."

13 Similarly, Dean Acheson stated that "it is ex-

\remely difficult under the present circumstances to increase the

18 a great demand for commodities,

1114

an assertion, that is perhaps

,,.

even more important..,. as this address contained the embryo of the
larshall Plan .

Thus, already before the formulation of the :Marshall Plan, the

•conomic policy of the Truman administration had revealed its inner
,~ontradicticn between the needs for domestic stability and the desire

12Ib·
-i_ci., p. 4.

13m

Irum~ Pa~~:

ttt
•

14

1947, p. 181-182.

Dean Acheson's address before the Del ta Council, Mississippi.
' 1947; printed in Joseph M::irion Jone~:;, }'ifteen \Jeeb_:;: An Ina
Accolmt
the --~--~.
Uen es i '~ _,,
of _"
"c:l': _e_.. ~~..:_:.:,
~1-:p··,~h'' J J ~~'
J>l"n ( l'Tew York
p. 277 f.
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the export trade for political purposes. The justification
for this

was found in the interpretation of the economic experiences
world War I, a parallel always available for more or less

after

application. Truman saw the cause for the recession in 1920
careful
iD the immediate abandonment of wartime control over domestic prices:

"The retail prices had outstripped the increase in consumers incomes
,
far that consuners buying power fell sharply and the price struc-

80

tures collapsed. 'l'hen followed the drop in production and employment,"

which had been one reason for the disaster in 1929

as the market

bad never regained its internal stability and self-confidence.

15

The

'•

depression in 1929, however, also had another cause

i.~hich

was to play

a major role in the debate of the Marshall Plan: " ••• not the sole

cause .... But I do say a major cause. This was the economic war of
1;:;

bilateral preferences and restrictions. u - - 'l'his interpretation,
called the

11

lesson of iforld War I," served to explain the contrast

between short range economic objectives in domestic and in foreign
policy. Moreover, it came to serve as a rationale for the economic
policy of the Viarshall Plan. 1 7

During the sp:ring of 1947, the situation in Western Europe had
~eteriorated both from a political and from an economic point of

low.,

15E conomic He port, July 21, 194 7, p. 6; nee also, Truman Papers:

aA.i_, p. 250.

-

~ -._

16

Trumcm Papers: 194 7, p. 128, Address at 13aylor University,

narch. 6, ig 47 .

....,
- 25 view. On March 12, President Truman responded to the civil war in
Greece.and to the threat of aggression against Turkey by launching
the doctrine which carries his name. With.this statement, the United
states had officially taken over the burden of securing the Middle.
East and the, Mediterranean Sea from the alleged Communist aggression.
The sudden liquidation of the British financial and military commitment in Greece drew the attention of State Department planners
to the general economic situation in Western Europe. Out of the
shocking confrontation with a few figures of foreign trade statistics
and with a general review of the economic and political prospects in
this part of the world grew basic ideas behind the Marshall Plan.
Obviously, the Marshall Plan did not mature in one single mind
but was the result of many impulses. Among sQme of the most con-··
spicuous were the reports of William Clayton from a. trip to Europe,
the Moscow Conference, Marshall's visits in burope an his way back from
the. U.S.S.R., and Acheson's initiative of setting up study groups
18
•
•
th e nuropean
D
si't ua t"ion.
f or reviewing
It has been argued that not only the basic assumptions, within
which the plan was conceived, but also the more concrete ideas and
devices of the plan, had long been on their way, and hence, that the
European Recovery Program in fact manifested the climax of a long
tradition of employing economic tactics as the main instrument of
foreign policy. 19 There remains little doubt,
1

~Jones, Fifteen Weeks, p. 129-148; Kennan, Memoirs, p. 342-388.

19

(New

however, that the

walt~r LaFeber, America, Rusrda, and the Cold War, 1945-1966,
York, 1968), p. 52.
. ,,

events

pr~ceding

- 26 the launching of the plan created a tense excitement in

ttie State Department, not dissimilar to the one which had followed

Pearl Harbor. The impact of the r.ealization of a situation, the
basic elements of which had more or less been apparent since the
New Year, seemed so overwhelming to the persons involved.,. that a radical conversion of the traditional foreign policy appeared to be
20
reflected in the Acheson and Marshall addresses.
The first public statement which clearly connected the new insight intm the European problems with the economic situation in
the United States was Dean Acheson's Delta Address on May 8, 1947.
Together with Marshall's Harvard Address on June 5, 1947, it seems
to indicate the basic impetus for the launching of the ERP. Con, centrating on humanitarian aspects of the plan, Marshall only
briefly mentioned that "the consequence of non-intervention should
be apparent to all." 21 Acheson was, more frank when he admitted that
"the measures of relief and reconstruction have only in part been
suggested by humanitarianism," and should instead be considered
"chiefly as a matter of nationa,l self-interest~ 1122 As revealed by
Joseph M. Jones, who drafted Acheson's
20

Both Jones and Kennan
ment of the time. See Jones,
Memoirs, p. 345: "So earnest
I recall one occasion,in the
composure, left the room and
ing."
21

~peech,

the background had

recall, the atmosphere and the excite.Pifteen Weeks,p. 199-214; Kennan,,
and intense were the debates, ••• that
late evening, when I, to recover my
walked weeping around the entire build-

Printed in Jones, Fifteen Weeks, p. 281-284 .

. "

-
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-

been "the discl.osure in concrete terms of a portentous situation
that had been known only in a general way. 112 3
The core of the Delta Address was a revelation of the disequi" librium between export and import. It was also an estimation of European purchasing power:
Our exports ••• during the current year are estimated to a total
of 16 billion dollars •••• ~his represents one month's work for
each man, one month's output from every farm, factory, and mine •
••• In return •.• we estimate commodities from abroad to the
value of about 8 billion dollars. This is just about half as
much as we are exporting •••• How are foreigners going to get the
United States dollars to 9over this huge difference? And how are
they going to get the United States dollars necessary to cover
a likely difference of nearly the same amount next year? These
are some of the most important questions in international relations today.24
The questions to which Dean Acehson called attention remained
at the center of the debate on foreign relations until the ERP was
passed by Congress in the spring of 1948, Inflation dominated the
domestic scene, while the political and economic future of Europe
controlled the argument of foreign policy. These issues seemed to
I

meet in the question of a change in the economic relationship to Eu-

Well aware of the importance attached to these sensitive issues, the President was very careful to·represent all powerful interest groups in the study of the problems of the ERP. For that
purpose, TrUtlan set up three special committees to hand in recommendations that would cover a wide range of political opinions as
2

3Jones, Fifteen Weeks, p. 208.

24 Ibid., p. 274-275.
,

-
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...

, . well as a broad spectrum of influential economic groups. These com~·.

mi ttees, which reflected both the. structure of American society and
the basic economic objectives of policy, defined in the following
months where the emphasis and the thrust of American foreign policy
was to be placed. Composing these committees in such a way that they
by themselves signified a reproduction of the socio-economic fabric
of American society, Truman consciously planned to make full use of
the basic consensus on the definition of national objectives and interest. By this action Truman strengthened the ground for future bipartisan support of the conduct of foreign policy; with this action 1
he reflected one aspect of the one-dimensional character of American
power and politics, as he, sure of the basic agreement among the interests, incorporated potential opposition on the matter of tactics
into the planning of the program. 2 5
2
5The findings of the three committees were represented to the
public in:
a)U.S., Department of Interior, National Resources and Foreign Aid: First Report to Congress from the Economic Cooperation !£ministration, Oct. 9, 1947, (Washington, D.C., 1947). "The task assigned was to explore the state of our physical resources and report
on their adequacy to contribute to foreign reconstruction." (Truman
Papers: 1947, Oct. 18, 1947). This comrpittee was set up to meet the
widespread belief that the United States was at the bottom of its
natural materials, especially the strategic ones. In this effort,
it was only a matter of course for the committee to emphasize the
need for access abroad to such products. The study became known as
Krug's Report.
b)Council of Economic Advisers, The Impact of Foreign Aid
Upon the Domestic Economy, Oct., 1947, (Washington D.C., 1947). "An
economic analysis of the effect th9.t a foreign aid program .•. would.
have on •.. production, on domestic consumption and prices, and on
government finance and the tax structure." (Truman Paoers: 1947, Nov.
1, 1947). 'l'his report became publicly known as the Nourse Report.
~)President's Committee on Foreign Aid,, European Recovery
and American J,.id, H.eport from the Committee of 19 Distinguished
.

- 29 Upon these reports, the administration constructed its representation of both short-run and long-run effects of the ERP upon
the domestic economy. J:;'or the short range considerations, the cain
argument rested on an estimation of the marginal effects of exports
in an inflationary situation in an over":"employed economy. Though
admitting that the rise in prices stemmed mainly from the docestic
demand, the administration acknowledged that ''the final test of the
inflationary impact is the size of a net export surplus" and that
"it would of course be easier for us to win the battle against inflation if we could use the goods we are exporting to help meet the
26
.
heavy demand at home."
Stressing the marginal effect of exports,
especially in food, Harriman stated that "the extra withdrawal from
the domestic market -~ •• has made a real difference in food prices. 1127
Hence, the administration argued in mid-1947 that "a !'eduction
in exports during the previous six months would not have reduced employment in the same proportion, since workers could have shifted
from export to the domestic market. 1128 In mid-1948, Truman was even
Private Citizens, Headed by the Secretary of Commerce, Averell
Harriman, Nov. 7, 1947, (Washington, D.C., 1947). Because of its
broader discussion of "the problem of European recovery and our interest therein," and because of its assignment to furnish a "nonpolitical argument", (Truman Papers: 1947, Nov. 7, 1947), this report became the most influential and best known of the three. It
was generally known as the Harriman Report.
26

House, Postwar Recovery, p. 467.

·27 Harriman H.eport, p. 101-103. For a similar. opinion, see also
Nourse Report, p~ 22-27.
28

E~•conumic
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Report, J u l y, 21 , 19 Lt1 r7 , p. 47 •

- 30 sure that "the unfilled demands of the American market, with its
enormous purchasing power, would sustain our ~rosperity even if
foreign markets were sharply reduced. 1129 Seymour Harris, an active
participant in the public debate, told a Chicago audience of bankers
that the economic conditions were at the present relatively favorable for an adaptation of the economy to a smaller amount of export
in the future because of the· strength of the domestic demand. 30
Defending itself against charges from the left and from the CommunisiBthat the program was nothing but a device to find new out. lets for threatening surplus production, the administration pointed
to the actual fact that no such surplus was in existence at the time,
and neither was any anticipated in the near future. For the present,
the administration had tc arguo against those who said that "every
dollar's worth of goods in short supply, that we take out of our
economy ••• is going to multiply the pressure in almost geometric
proportions. 1131 Ta this, the executive answered, first that the
sacrific·es "will be only a small fraction of the cost of winning
the war, and they will be vital to winning the peace. 1132 Apart from
the long-run arguments, which will be examined later, it was secondly
29 Economic Report, July, 1948, p. 36.

30 seymour B. Harris and G.B. Hoover, "The Marshall Plan and its·
Costs," Journal of J:i"inance, Feb., 1948, p. 1-16; see also, Nourse
Report, p. 74. ~
3lu.s., Congre~s, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, European Rec,overy Program, Hearings, 80th Cong., 2nd sess., January
23, 1948, 'i(2 parts), p. 292; (hereafter Senate, ERP)~
/

. ,

32Bconomic Report, July 21, 1947,·p. 48.

- 31 that "we have already passed the export peak, 1133 and that
pressure on the domestic economy would be less under the pro-

gram

than the pressure which has resulted from the recent rate of

1134 The present situation compelled Congress to take action
exports.
against the inflation, anyway. As Harriman stated no less than three
ti.Jiles during the Foreign Relations hearing: "I feel that controls

;

111

be necessary regardless of the .European program." 35
These arr,uments were in full accordance with the estimated

amount of exports and imports under the ERP.

36

Assuming that the

appropriations. were passed' "our exports will be somewhat less in

1948 than in 1947, and our imports are expected to increase somevhat.1137 Hence, the burden on the domestic economy would diminish
,

in the short run as the favorable balance of· trade, the vast sur..,.
I,;

plus of exports over imports, was sunDosed to decrease even under

the Marshall Plan. 38
Reconsidering the

i~ediate

state of economic affairs from the

Yi.ewpoint of the administration, the evidence seems to underline
t.'

for the inflationary tendencies of the unsatisfied domestic
33
34

House, Postwar Recoverv, p. 464, and p. 467.
_Ibid., p.

35s enate

37

'

473.

PRP

_.i:i_l_,

p. 275-277.

House, Postwu~ Recoverv, p. 467.
9f3-102.

-
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rather than to point to the danger of nn ir:uninent recession
a radical decline in exports. To the administration, the fear
and the fear of surplus production for contracting
related to each other, in so far as they represented
way to depression. On the other hand, the
:-;;'

, reme
.!

d. es for each of these stages appeared to be different, and to
i

f
degree even contradictory to each other, according to"the leseouie
War I". 39 Hence, a close consideration of whi~h of

stages the Truman administration deerJed to be at hand might
a key for an understanding of the short-run motivation behind

Plan.
Williams seemed to emphasize an impending recession due to a
production, as he pointed to the "increasing
and to "thP. :E-,roa serious economic slump 11

•

40 The evidence was found in the

the President's Economic Advisors, a source which, un. k nown on 1 y in
.
J ones ' accoun t . 41 Al so, premoni. t ion
.
is

was reflected in Acheson's Delta Address:"If the ex_cted export decline due to foreign inability to pay coincided with

ness in the domestic economy, the effect on production, prices,
r1iGht be most serious.
39'

1142

.

Sec above, p.24.

40 .
W1lliar:w, 'rr::~, p. 267 f.; see also, Lal<'eber, .Q91d \1ar, P. 4 7.

- 33 It seems to be true that segments of business and industry.prerecession in the middle of 1947. The Economic Report of
1948, admitted

"tha~

the impact of expected foreign aid

wide attention, stimulating economic expectations. n43 I:t .is
however, to what degree this prognosis was believed in the
during mid-1947. For his part, Truman never referred to
it •. To the contrary, Trw:ian concentrated his attention on the prices
and "the very high profits" and denied any expectations of recession.
if the price structure was kept intact.

44

On April 21; 1947, Truman repeated his opinion of the nature and
the stage of the development of reconversion. He charged that "profits
in the aggregate are breaking all records," having even surpassed the
war level 133 percent. Again pointing to his.concern over inflation,
he stated that "there is only one sure formula for bringing on a recession or a depression: that is to maintain excessively high prices.
Hence,.. a fQreign aid program at this time would tend to endanger the
economy rather than relieve it. The threat to stable development
came primarily from skyrocketing prices and subsequent undercutting
of income and purchasing power. The task of the administration, as
Truman argued, was to curtail or decrease the demands both from

do~

mestic and foreign sources in order to preserve the price structure.
The Marshall Plan had to be undertaken not because, but in spite of

43~conornic Report, Jan., 1948, p. 42y

44 Truman Papers: 1947, April 10, 1947, p.
;

45 Ibid.,
\.
p. 213-214.
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.
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- 34 1ts short-run· effects on the domestic economy: "It is worth enduring
temporary shortages

within the United States, t'his will bring

~

;, iasting benefits in the long run,"

46

Confronted with the disequilibrium between supply and demand
the abandonment of price control, the administration was left
with a few frustrating alternatives. One possibility was .to appeal
to business and labor to show ·modesty, and this was done continuously
throughout this period, but as r:i,.sing prices show, with very little
.result. Secondly, Truman could attempt either to increase production
-or to decrease the demand by fiscal means. Thirdly, he could ask for
··powers to control demand. 47
~he

possibility of changing supply or demand through Congress

was blocked, too. Ever .. since the midterm election of 1946, the Re(•

t
f

publican Party, which controlled the majority in Congress, had been

(
~

· pressing for a tax reduction •. Even with a· surplus budget1 very little
could be accomplished this way. Similarly, the chance of inc_re·asing
production was effectively obstructed by the law of diminishing returns, "the stubborn and intractable fact a:bout an economy already
operating at peak .•• that output can not be expanded except by slow
degrees. 1148 Left was only the.alternative of convincing Congress,
who had already dropped price controls, that the only way to maintain a reasonable purchasing power and. to avoid the economic and

. 46 Economic Report, July 21, 1947, p. 48.
47 Harr,y S. Truman, Memoirs, 2 vols., (Garden City, lLY., 1955),
Vol. II, "Yep.rs of Tr~al and Hope", p. 112-117.
f.

i

·'

48 Bconomic Report, Jan., 1948, p. 43.

- 35 social consequences of inflation was to stabilize the price structure by curtailing profits through interference with the law of
supply and demand.
~he

commitment to the Marshall Plan added a strong argument to

the case of controlling the economic development. Since 1946, Truman
had stressed the obvious social injustice of inflation. As the ideological frontiers of the Cold War hardened, he referred more and
more often to the challenge to the free economy. "Our system of private enterprise is now being tested before the world. If we can prove
that it is more productive and more stable ••• than other economies,
we shall have won the test. 1149 In this context, the Marshall Plan
added another argument that linked the potential success of the p'lan
to the domestic price structure.
To-this came, of course, the pure economic considerations. It
was a self-evident condition for a succesful achievement of European
recovery that scarce dollar resources and American aid were not to
be undermined by rising prices in the United States where the commadities at least in part 1 were to be bought~ Seymour Harris concluded
1
that'tshould inflationary forces cumulate, the monetary costs of the
program would rise ••. and the ERP would be in jeopardy. 1150 The administration fully agreed in this opinion and recognized

11

that

carrying it tERPJ out will make it all the more important that we
49Truman l1apers: 1947, p. 212.
5-oSeymour E. Harris, The European H.ecovery: Program, (New York,
1948), p. 185.
j

I

. "

36
invoke the measures req.uired to stop the inflation. 1150
Hoping that "in highlighting the inflation ••• the ERP may well
~;--

mobilize the anti-inflationary forces of this country and contribute
towards solving the problem of inflation, 1152 the administration
started to link the issues of domestic policy more and more closely
to the foreign aid program. Already, shortly after Dean Acheson's
Delta Address, Truman had asked for an extension of the act, which
during the war had provided authority for maintaining control over
certain goods and strategic materials with the mo.tivation that "it
is of direct interest to our own economy and indispensable in supporting our international policy." On the very day of Marshall's
Harvard Address, Truman stated that "the fact that necessary foreign aid programs add to our economic problems at home makes it
all the more important that we handle these domestic problems with
t:"Z

vigor and common sense. 11 ..1_.1
Backed by the reports of the special committees, that all emphasized that "the foreign aid program compels us to face the domestic problems squarely," Truman's efforts to make Congress, for
reasons of

fore~gn

.

policy, pass the regulation that had already been

defeated as a means of solving the domestic problems, reached a
.climax in the calling of a special session of Congress. 54 In his
.5lEconomic Heport, Jan., 1948, p. 43.
5?Truman Papers: 1947, p. 263.

54Ndurse Report, p. 99.
'

•
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- 37
radio address of October 24, 1947, Trucan motivated this action by
stressing that"peace and prosperity, prosperity for all our people,
peace for all the world," were two aspects of the same issue, because
". "the same measures would be necessary and should be used" to secure
the Marshall Plan a proper success and to stabilize the domestic
economic development.55
But Truman did not attempt to make the ERP dependent upon the
granting of controls. In his diaries Truman wrote: "Ltold them that
I had taken this action partly so that Congress might take steps to

halt the rising price spiral within our own nation but mostly to
6
meet the crisis in Western Europe. 11 5
The Marshall Plan necessarily had to bring out in the open disagreement among the different interest groups that were affected by
such pri:ui:u1e; of the export pump. This disagreement was

reflP.~ted

in

the debates in Congress and at the hearings, where, for instance,
Senator Hickenlooper asked for "a little more businesslike calculation" of the effects to the domestic economy, "especially as it now
exists and the pressures that are on it .•.. It does not do a great
deal of good, in my mind, to say that years from now, we will be
much better off . 1157 Just as there were interest

groups that were

opposed to the liberalization of trade because of a favored position
in th~ domestic r:iarket, 58 the Marshall Plan was opposed by groups
55 Truman Papers: .1.211,, p. 364.
56Truman, Memoirs, vol. II, p. 117.

~ t e,
0ena

570

1 ~Rl) P• 291
- ·
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- 38 that were concerned about taking out

income~producing

goods and

" ••• merely donating these to other countries which in turn will produce income and profit out of those physical goods~ 1159 Other, perhaps more influential groups preached the blessings of expansion of
exports.

60

But it seems a mistake to equate the administration with those
who favored expansion of trade at all costs. Instead, the government
argued ·for the long range benefits of the Marshall Plan even at the
expense of domestic difficulties. Although surpassed by the needs of
foreign policy

~rtd

by the prospect to advantages in the long run,

the problems of inflation enjoyed a high position on. the list of
priorities of the Truman administration. Only when the hope to solve
the domestic troubles through controls had been totally destroyed
by Congress, did '.L1ruman choose bstween the

BlWL'

L a.ml the long range

issues, between the domestic and the foreign policy.
This choice was based on an estimation of the long range needs
and benefits. The question remains as to how the

admi~istration

de-

fined and conceived these requirements as,par.t and parcel of the
national interest of the United States. ·

58 see later, p. 41.

59 8enate, BRP, p. 290; for the disagreement among various interest groups, see House, Postwar Recovery.
60

se~ for instance the testimony of National Association of

Manufacture's, Senate, BHP.

"
/

IV. The Marshall Plan in European Perspective

· It has been attempted to examine the short-run motivation of
the Marshall rlan in this paper. Focusing on the arguments of the
administration it has been stressed that the estimated impact of
the ERP on the then economic situation tended to add to the domestic
problems rather than to solve them.

Furtherm~re,

it has been demon-

strated how Tru.ruan tried to point to the ETIP in his effo:i·t to

i:. ~vµ

the inflation, although Congress refused to consider the question
of domestic controls.
In the end, however, the reasoning both of the administration
and of those interest groups, who were concerned over the economy
from other angles than that of the administration - angles, which
were often directly corresponding to their location in production,
reveal the same basic features. More important than the disagreement among the different interest groups was the theme of the disc:µssion.over the short-run issues of the Marshall Plan policy, the
shared ideas of the function of the government as a stabilizer of
the domestic economic development and as a guarantor for the preservation~f

a socio-economic structure conducive to the interests

/

- 40 ·0 f

business as a class. In the short run the government was to make

smooth the economic growth and with the Keynesian tools remove the
threat of recurrent depressions, which had menaced the social order
at various times, and hence, maintain a concensus on the objectives
of foreign policy.
Exactly because the validity of these goals .. was never questioned, it was possible for Truman to use the belief in the connection between domestic and foreign policy as an

~rgument.

In or-

der to try to determine these basic assumptions behind the reasoning of the

Mar~hall

Plan, in order to define aspects of the ideology

of political economy, it is necessary to examine the long-run objectives of the ERP.
In a recent essay, Thomas G. Paterson set out to define the relationohip between American fears of communicm and the need for expanding markets ·to avert depression, as these themes were revealed
in the motivation behind the Marshall Plan. The connection Paterson found in the "peace and prosperity concept". This concept held
"that a prostrate Europe would be a breeding ground for Communism,
'

that a faltering European economy would. be unable to provide the
goods and markets so essential to the world and American economies;'
and hence, endanger the American conceptfuon of peace.

1

So far Paterson seemed to follow Williams' definition of the
issues of foreign policy in the Cold War. In his conclusion, how;I.Thomas G Paterson, "The Quest for Peace and Prosperity," in
Barton J .. Bernstein, ed., l)oli tics and Policies of the Truman Administration, (Chicago, 1970), p. 6.
/

- 41 ever, Paterson moved beyond Williams' thesis and stressed the role
of tactics rather than that of ideology as· a means for an

under~

I

standing of the conduct of foreign affairs. "Rather the central
questions are: How and to whom did the United States extend its
help? How did the United States use.its economic power'?" 2
Paterson found support for his shift of emphasis in the fact
that neither business nor government officials supported·a buildup of the Cold War in order to make money. These groups "would
rather have made their profits an easier way - preferably through
secure, unencumbered, and ardent economic expansion at home and
abroad. ,; 3 Some. business groups like the wool-producers denied the
need for an aggressive expansion of foreign trade, and in spite of
the advocacy of open-door and liberal trade principles, the administration and many American corporationo practiced the use of
.bilateralism, state trading, import and export controls, and cartels. 4 .n.lso in the case of help to underdeveloped regions, "there
was a shortcoming in

the fulfillment of the peace and prosperity

concept," as American aid oftep went to reactionary regimes~ which
were resisting the development of Ameri9an oriented social and economic institutions that presumably could have resisted and counter::
balanced unstable and revolutionary polimics. 5
2
·

.3

Ibid., p • 105.

.
Ibid•, p • 104.

. 4.

Ibid., p. 85.
i

5
'

l.

'·

,

Ibid., p. 104.
/
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In order to determine whether Paterson with his conclusion is
rnoving beyond Williams or whether his analysis is rather to be re-

~,:

~. garded as a retreat, it is necessary to take a second look at the

·: 'C·American ideology of political economy.
It is unquestionably true that promotion of liberalization of
trade played an important role in the planning and conduct of for1

eign policy in the post-war years. .l.'.his applied to the European
countries as well as to the world as a whole. Willard L. Thorp,
·Assistant Secretary of State, expressed a widely held opinion when
he stated:
Our entire foreign policy, in which reciprocal trade agreements and the proposed International Trade Organi2ation are
important ·elements, is directed toward achieving a vast 1expansion of trade among all nations with benefits to all.6
Hence, the idea behind the ITO

~ame,

from the American point

of view, close to being a corollary to the conditions of the ERPpolicy. Undersecretary of Commerce, William L. Clayton,- had a clear
opinion of this relationship, when he characterized the ERP as a
11

short-range program for one part of the world" and ITO

as the"lo-

gical extension in the long range," and added about tying the ITO
with the Marshall Plan that "it is already tied in. 117
Already the Marshall Address had clearly made any aid dependent on a joint European initiative. It remained the American in6nepartment of State Bulletin, XVII, (November 2, 1947), p.
865, "Buropean Recovery -:- a Project for America." (Hereafter DS~) ..

7u.s.,

Congress, House, Foreign Affairs Committee, United
States 1''oreipn Policy for 1)ostwar Recovery; Hearings, 80th Cong.,
1st and 2nd sess., 2 parts, 1948, p. 323-325. (Herafte:r House,
l)ostwar i~ecovery).
. ,,
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through the ERP "to break down the nationalistic
which have caused so much economic difficulty in the past,"
to establish an integrated European system ·open to Ameriexport and investment. 8 It was Harriman's hope that "the co:operative relationships ••• undertaken to develop during the recov-

.,, ..

period •••. may lead to permanent relationships. 119
This policy, however, confronted the United States with the
problem of being a creditor. In spite of a growing realization
the difficulties that arise from being rich among paupers, and
the need to balance exports against imports, the administration
·.still had to calm down the fear of competition in the- domestic market. Clayton assured the business community that "there is no peril
to our tariff system in the ITO," because ITO was only supposed to
cope with "quantitative restrictions, preferential arrangements,
discriminatory practices and so on," leaving intact the structure
10
of tariffs as a means for trade protection.
As Truman expressed
the difference: "Governments may impose tariffs, but they do not
dictate the quantity of trade, the sources' of imports, or the destination of exports. Individual transactions are a matter of pri"·'.:·

vate choice. 1111
B,I
rouse, P os t war R ecovery, p. 462 .

9 Ibid. , p. 46 3.

lOibid. , p. 326
11u.s.\ President, "Harry S. Truman: 1947", Public Paners of
the 1-'resider1ts of the United Sta tP.a, . . (Washington, D. C., 1962), p.

m.

(dcre:.1.fter'::ir'lllii'an .i'apers).

/

- 44 Truman confirmed his opinion of liberal trade as something to
be seen strictly in the context of economic systems,_ when he ex":"
plained that he preferred the expression "the trade of free men"
12
to the term "free trade 11 •
This point of view was connected with
a

co~sideration

of the American economic strength. Given the eco-

nomic power of American industry, which controlled well above 50
percent of the industrial capacity of the world, and considering
the fact that the 62 largest manufacturing corporations in the
United States at the end of the war had accumulated liquid capital
sufficient to purchase the assets of nearly 80 percent of all corporations in the United States, 13 it seemed that Truman's definition of free trade represented the climax of the open-door trading
policy,which, for the first time, was extended to the European
powers.
Along with the promotion of free access to European markets, 14
the presentation of the Marshall Plan expressed a more mature understanding of the need to increase

imports in order to stabilize

the economic development in the long run. The lesson
!

of the twenties

had not been in vain. Already on ApriL 13, 1947, Harriman had written an article in the Washington Post, "'Buy American' is a dead
_,slogan," stating that the gap of surplus exports over imports would

12

Ibid., P• 275.

13The Federal Trade Commission's Report, in Denna F. Fleming,
The Cold War and its Origins, 1917-1960, (2 vols., Garden City, N.Y.;
1961),. I, p. 437.

see~Foreign Aasisstance Act,,Sec. 115 (b), in Seymour E.
Harris, .Guropcnn Recovery Proeram~ (Chicac;o, ....__ 1948), p. 76 •
14
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have to be.narrowed, if the United States were to maintain the level
of export.. Instead, he proposed the slogan "Let's import for peace
and prosperity. 1115 Clayton also emphasized that "we have to import
many more things in order to sustain our own economy •••• By helping
these countries to get on their feet and increase their production,
I think, we do not only not hurt ourselves ••• we help ourselves in
the markets of the world. 1116
One of the most enlightening documents for a better

under~

derstanding of the economic universe, in which the idea of expansion
of trade and the idea behind the ERP was conceived, is probably
the Address QQ Foreign Economic Policv, delivered by Truman on a
visit to

'Baylor University, March 6, 1947. Defining the various

crucial elements of his economic and political credo as well as the
relationship between theoe elements, Truman illuminated the basic
assumptions behind his foreign policy. 17
Stating that "peace, freedom and world .trade are inseparable"
and that "there is one thing that the Americans value more than
peace. It is freedon. Freedom of worship, freedom of speech, freedom of enterprise," Truman went on to e.xplain that "the devotion to
freedom of enterprise in the United States has deeper roots than
·the desire to protect the profits of ownership. It is part and par15u.s., Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 80th Cong.,
1st sess., 1947, Appendix, p. 1859. 16 House, Postwar Recovery, p. 327.
17 Truman Paners: 1947, pp. 167-172.
\
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eel of what we call American." Denying that freedom of speech and
of worship could exist without the freedom of enterprise and further stressing the devotion t'o fight for free enterprise, Truman
repeated that "our foreign relations, political and economic, are
indivisible. We cannot say that we are willing to cooperate in one
field and are unwilling to cooperate in the other." Finally, Truman
)

defined free enterprise as the system "in which the major decisions .
are made, not by governments, bµt by private buyers and sellers .• 11

I

'·

The obvious militancy of these remarks was further accentuated by
Truman's promise to take an active part in the "process of expanding
trade."
The close relationship, if not identity between free trade,
free enterprise, and peace was concentrated in the expression "free
men's trade". The extent, to which this represented the opinion of
other members of the cabinet, was indicated when Harriman, on the
21st of May, 1947, stressed the American stake in an "expanding
world commerce, not only in terms of prosperity, but also in terms
of peace. 11 He reiterated that economic and political considerations
.

"are inextricably intertwined in the modern world."
t

~;

18

.

Marshall told

an audience of businessmen: "We are all stockholders in the same
compagny - the United States of America." Emphasizing that "the paramount question before us

can be stated in business terms," he

continued:
I am not a businessman, but I have some knowledge out of my
18

i

'

Co'ngressional He cord, 80th . Cong. , lot sess. , 194 7, app. p. 2395.
~

\

- 47 experience of what.had been required in the past to preserve
certain of our national assets in security, peace, and freedom •••. I think that is our role as a leader in a distressed
world.19
However, the reason why the Baylor Address is so important for
the analysis of the American political ideology in the postwar
world is to be found both in its aggressiveness and in the frank
statement of the objectives of foreign policy. But also the address
is most significant for what it obscures. Even a careful reading
doe~

not reveal exactly which charges were launched against the Krem-

lin and which against the Western European capitals. This balanc.e
seems to explain. aspects of the meaning of the Marshall Plan,
especially as this ambiguity was carried over into the debate of
the ERP.
According to the Harriman Report, "a European recovery program
is an investment in the continued survival of a world, economically
stabilized and peacefully conducted. 11 A failure to meet the challenge of the program could bring about a Communist take-over of
western Europe, and the domestic consequences would be such "as no
f'·

American could easily tolerate: the swift and complete conversion
to a military footing .••• The immediate.and sweeping limitation of
our economic and political life, ••. perhaps even of our very form
of government."

20

The meaning of this

i~as

.

quite clear. The United

19 nsB, XVIII, Jan. 25, 1948, p. 171.
20 Presidents Committee on Foreign Aid, European Hecover and
American Aid. (Washington, D.C., November, 1947), p. /19. Hereafter
Harrir:ian H.eport).

. "

- 48 States could not tolerate a Europe that was dominated by one power.
In 1947, this was an accepted definition of the United States' physical security interest which the military engagement in two world
wars had made a common-place in international politics.
The Harriman Report, however, also contained another definition
of the American national interest:
-It [the Marshall Plan] will involve sacrifices but it may also
be cheaper in the long run. The illusion that it would be
thrifty to do nothing would be shattered if, by such a policy
the future existence or development of our economic and political institutions should be seriously jeopardized. 21
The

quest~on

is apparently left open as to what exactly would

cause the threat to United States domestic integrity. The answer,
however, is soon given. After an enumeration of the importance of
European buying power to the domestic economy, the report continues:
The deterioration of the European economy, lack of means to
obtain essential imports would force European countries to resort to trade by governmental monopoly - not only for economic
but for political ends. The United States would almost inevitably have to follow suit. The resulting system of state controls, at first relating to foreign trade, would soon have to
be extended into the domestic economy to an extent that would
endanger the survival of the American system of enterprise.22
Defining the threat to national integrity in terms of any European action, that could limit the expansion of foreign trade,
Harriman went far beyond the conventional balance-of-power definition of national security. 23 By making the American economic arid
21 Ibid., p. 18.
22 Ibid.

3My~attention was pointed to this aspect of the ERP by Robert
W. Tucker,' The Ha.di cal Left and American Foreip;n Policy, Studies in
2

.

.,.
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political system directly dependent on the internal order of the
~uropean

powers, Harriman reflected a clear imperial interest and

obvious imperial intentions which had been apparent in the formulation of American foreign policy at least since the turn of the
century. But for the first time this conception was explicitly extended to the metropolises of the European imperial powers, and for
the first time, vast_ political and economic resources were utilized
to reach objectives so far beyond the traditional security interest.
The·way, the Harriman Report arranged the two definitions of
the dependence ..of national integrity upon the European situation
is revealing. Because the consequences of a Oommunis·t take-over or
of the adoption of protectionistic policies by European governments
were both identified as a threat to the social and economic institutions in America, the traditional domestic acception of the conventional definition of security could be exploited to ensure the
popular approval of the imperial definition. Hence, the fusion of
the two concepts by itself promoted the policy of the administration
as the Marshall Plan could be argued as a'necessary tool to secure

..

economic access to Europe in_a logical extension of the military
engagement during the war. Carried to its ultim~te extremes, howeve~
this reasoning would inevitably have lead to advocating a military
intervention in Eastern Europe. But that, of course, .was beyond the
intentions of the administration, who merely wanted to utilize the
argument for reasons of its liberal appeal. Still, the Truman adi

Internation~l

Affairs Number 15, (Baltimore, 1971), p. 55-156. The
conclusions, however, which will be drawn in this paper from the·
distinction between the narrow and the broader def~nition of national interest are quite different fron Tucker's suggestions.

.

-~

- 50 ·administration must carry a heavy resopnsibili ty for its elaborations
on the fusion between the two concepts of na.'tional interest. 24
Two points have to be underlined in order to understand how
the definition of the imperial interest was directly reflected in
the pursuance of the policy of the Marshall Plan and how the plan
in the arguments of the Truman administration became identical with
the long-run and basic national objectives of the United States'
foreign policy.
First, it is necessary, once more, to point to the importance
the administration placed on exports in general: "Millions of Americans •.• depend on foreign trade. If we are to protect the interests
of these people, in their investment and employment, we must see to
it that our foreign trade does not decline. 112 5·Harriman stated that
11

durine the war we trenend?usly expanded our industrial and agricul-

tural production, and we now need permanen_t and expanding world
markets."

26

.

Also Clayton stressed this in the strongest terms during

the Congressional Hearings:
Mr. Mansfield: It would appear to ne, that one of the basic
elements in the considerations of the ERP would be the fact
that over the long term we would bunefit tremendously, from
an economic point of view; and' if we don't we will have de24For the ambiguity that was introduced into the debate, see

the discussion bet~reen Marshall and Lodge, Senate, ERP, p. 98 ff. As
it seems, the stand of the administration on the problem of defining
the national interest without resortine to right~wing nhetoric has
a striking parallel in Truman's position in the question of internal
security.
25 Truman Papers: 1947, p. 171-172.
26

2395.

.

.

Conc;rensional Record, 80th. -Con~., 1st sess., 194 7, app. p. ·

- 51 flation in this country. i'fe will have surpluses. Nobody will
have anything to buy our goods with, and then where will we
be'?

Mr. Clayton: I think that is exactly right. We cannot, in the
United States, be the only prosperous country in the world.
\tie cannot be the only free enterprise country in the world.
If we want to keep free and prosperous we had better have some
cocpany ...• If we do not ..• we are going to make such radical
changes, I am afraid, in our own economy in this country that
it would be very difficult for a democratic, free-enterprise
system to make.27
The point Clayton made about the necessity of liberal trade

with Burope, if radical change in Aoerican society was to be e.scaped,
vas the second basic assuoption behind the riarshall Plan. Moreover,

Clayton t iecl

this to the assumption of the need for expansion

of exports in the idea of the relationship between foreign and doaestic policy. The preservation and expansion of the European mar-

solubly tied to not only the conservation of peace, but to the sur-

vival of the social, economic, and political institutions of the
United States i tseJf.

The accordance with the Baylor Address is obvious. In this,
!ruman had stated that if a more liberal pattern of trade was not
United i3tates would soon

11

find its elf in the hvsiness

foreign goods ar:iong importers ann foreign markets
among exporters and telling every trader what he could buy and sell~
when, and where. It is not the lu11erican way. It
to ;)eace. 11

28

'l'horp, also, expressed a similar view:

2e,,,

~1~.CJ.l

L?_:i~r

,

l ' . 1? o .

- 52 I wish to emphasize, then, that the pattern of international
trade adopted by the leading trading nations must be a matter
of great concern to those who wish to preserve the American
economic systeo in the United States, let alone strenghten it .
• • • }'ailure to carry through effectively on our pa::·t means that
we risk our international leadership in the economic field, our
foreign trade, and some aspects of our economic system itself .29

At least some time before the nilitary security of the Unito,d
. states was considered at stake, the Truman administration had developed the concept of a close relationship between free access to
expanding markets and the socio-economic institutions in the United
its elf. Thorp stated that he saw "no ef>cape from the fundaproposition: We cannot separate our dooestic and foreign
affairs. 1130 To the administration the only alternative to expansion
was domestic controls, equated with Socialiso, and far
change at home.

~here

was no other possibility in existence.

of free enterprise and the preservation of democratic prinThe other leads in the direction of Socialism and state

To some degree, the
~;of

~arshall

Plan can be seen as an expression

the conventional balance-of-power concept of n::ttional interest.
that respect it signified a continuation of the First World War
J

29

u.s.,

Department of Gtate,

Pro11cm~

omic l'..2_liQl'_, rublica ti on ;~7 50. Cornmerc:i.al

ept., 1947. p. 26.
30
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,f)y

·

',ill

the attempt to build a pardon sanitaire as far east as possible
0

rder to contain the Cor:lIIlunist contagion behinP, a barrier of

strong

national states. But also, the Marshall Plan went beyond
in its implementation and accomplishment, as the ERP policy
the internal order of the European powers as a necessary
for a stabilization of the American social and economic
even further than that, it appeared to Washington

that the European problems were not to be limited to the geographic

European continent. Instead Europe had to be conin

~

world-wide context.

I'

I
I

I
I
I

,

V. The Marshall Plan as a World View

Most historical accounts of the genesis and basic motivation

of the Marshall Plan have found it natural to treat the EE1-1 as a
specific European problems. To some extent, the
~aent

ar~u-

of the Harvard Address has been taken at its face value.

~Jarshall

explained that Europe had been given priority, because

·,';

·~~·the ".7"~~:.r !:.~;~2- t,.:rd.8

t~c v:~r-ld

Q±°

e_

p~~o °b2-(;!'!l ~s

"V'll~r<,1-l"Vln.C
··- .... ' l -·~-~ .. __,

'T,Tl'\r"'\10
. . . - ....~. -·

~
---

direction of our assistance to the critical areas where it can
most ir:imediately effective. 111 Al though this statement focussed
Europe, it also extended the perspective of the plan beyond,
Marshall ex1)ressec1 the American view of the relatiom:;l1ip betwe1:m
ope and its dependent areas.
In his Delta Address, Dean Acheson had been
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argument is basically the same as Marshall's, yet crucial and
reachinz implications are made explicit.
It is important to realize that even if the ERP essentially
ba.d a

~uropean

form, it was conceived as a response to the "chal-

1enge of American f oreir;n policy

...

not on the limited basis of one

"3 This approach to the
area, but on a global basis of every area.
needs of the United States directly reflected the major
of the planning dur.ing the war which have been analysed
by Gabriel Kolko. The political assumption was that the great capitalist states and their dependencies would end the war as powers which
control and reform; and not that the war had irrevocably weakened the prewar order. 114 Hence, one of the key expressions
BRP was in Marshall's words: '' .•. the restoration of Europe
~

--- . . ,, 5

t:: L:U.ilU1!l,Y •

even beyond 1914: "It is our hope that ... we wJll be able to get
d

the world back to a multilateral form of trade, pretty much the
basis of pre-'dorld War I. 116
Accordance with this thinking was obvious in the planning of
~H~.

It manifested itself most consistently in the concept of

Trj_angle 'l1 rade, in which the function of the European economy
2
After Jones, l"ifteen Weeks, p. 279.
3
House, Postwar hecoverv, p. 98.

4

Gn.ln·ie1 l:o1ko, The l)olitics of \far, (New York, 1968), p. 265.

in its international perspective. At the Congressional
·

11ea

rings, Dean

~cheson

defined this trading system which to

liberal thinking had been basic for domestic prosperity:

[Before the wai:J Europe's existence depended on triangular or
quadrangular trade. An unfavorable balance of trade with one
area, as it is called, was balanced off by a favorable balance
with other areas ••.• One half of the imports of western Europe
came from the ~:es tern Hemisphere, but an equivalent amount
of its products did not come here. Instead large amounts went
to eastern .Europe and Southeast Asia which sent their prodticts
to this continent as well as to Europe. In this way these areas
paid western Europe, which could pay us.7
For its part, the Ilarriman Report not only

the para-

~entioned

mount importance of a prosperous .Europe a~noutlet for a potential
expansioE of exports when the domestic market had been satisfied 1
it also stated that "the prosperous conditions in Burope are es-

sential to the maintenance of llmerican trade in other parts of the

world." 8 Truman had the same idea in mind, when he underlined in
his Special Net.> sage to vont;re::os, Det.:enLer 19, 194 7,
of our own economy, European recovery is essential,

Ll1&L '' .i.D te:r1iiS

and proceeded

11

to draw the attention to the trade system which before the war had
_furnishecl Burope with payments from tht:) surplus of exports of secondary products to the prir:mry producing countries.

9

Neither had the British much Cloubt· about where the means to
buy the surnlus of imports from the United States had come from in
the past and was to come from j.n the future. T1ord JCeynes told the

7.
House,
8
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gouse of Lords that it would never be a question of having to
the

pay

United States by direct exports. Hather the object were to pay

nited States by exporting to any other part of the world, "and
the U
it is partly for that very reason that the Americans have felt that

the multilateral system was the only sound basis for any arrangement
of this kind.

1110

Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ernest Bevin, fully

agreed to this proposition. The future for the British economy lay
" •.• far afield. In the first place, we turn our eyes to Africa
and equally to all the overseas terrj_ tories." In the British, the
Dutch, the :French, the Belgian, and the Portuguese dependencies, the
sources of a balanced European trade was to be found. "They have
the raw materials, food, and resources which can be turned into
f-1dvantage: hoth to the people

gre:::it <!0mmor1

of

th~

torr:i.tor:i.es them-

selves, and to the world as a whole."J_l

In addition to the American need for Europe, which on its side
depended on its territories as earners of dollars, came the direct
12
need for raw materials.
Clayton often talked about the necessity
" •.. for all kinds of raw materials to feed our huge productive
machine. 1113 Secretary Krug from the Interior Department told the
10

Atter :Jeymour B. Harris, ed., The Hew Economics: KeynQD_'
( ]~ondon, 1960), p. 394.

.!._nflum1ce on 'l'heorv and Public l)olicv,

11

]?

House,

--·nl~li.

.I'ostw~:1T

Recovery, p. 729.

,'.'/III, lJo. 1lV1, ,Tune ?.7, 1q,H~, p. ff27.

- 58 that the critical ma teriaJs could hardly
.fo r eign .Affairs Comrni ttee
·
be expected to be found in Burope in quantities that could be ex-

, ported. But the .European countries could contribute the equipment
and know-how "-.- .. and South America and Africa, China, and Inclia

provide the raw materials. 1114
After the Second World War, however, nationalistic movements
throughout the European dependencies had in various degrees gained
from the weakness of their

colonial powers and from the defeat of

Japan. The question was how fast the political and military vacuum

left over after the Japanese withdrawal could be

fill~d

again. The

·degree to which the traditional American attitude to the European
·colonies had been reversed by the possibility of acriess to the raw
materials through the open-door in Europe, was indicated by Assistant Secretary of Commerce, Mr.. Bissel, who stated that the

rn8

in

problem was " ••• when or if those territories will be politically
~cified,

and if so, how soon thereafter they will begin making

substantial exports of petroleum, tin, rubber, and other materials. 111 5
Thorp, was also uneasy about areas where the native populations were
on their

·way

towards independence, because these countries were

·often important for the resources of raw· materials·: "The present

; ~certainties concerning their probable political behavior create

a risk which f::;tands in the

way of immediate

~ ·lelopment. "16
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- 59 If it can be said that the American policy-makers ignored
deep-seated poverty in other parts of the world, they obviously

did not forget the American dependence on primary products from
these parts of the world. Hence, it seeos a

mistake·~

priori to

exclude such areas from the "peace ancl prosperity" approach to
.··
l? I ns t ea d , th
world po 1 itics.
· ere appears t o b e reason t o see th e
Marshall l?lan in a broader context and to extend the description
of the motivation behind it in order to cover the world-view that
was reflected in its basic assunptions. Exactly the fact that the
developing areas Here explicitly included in the EHP policy and
the role it was planned

they carry out, adds important features

to the understanding of the basic visions behind the EHP.

Con-

trary to IJaterson' s suggestion that the peace and prosperity concept was not applied universally or consistently, the evidence seems
to indicate that the realization of the need for free access to raw
and strategic materials in a free market-place economy was deeply
embedded and integrated in

~he

approach of the Marshall Plan to the

crisis in Western Europe. If already the Atlantic Charter had stated
this need as an absolute precondition t6 economic development and
peace, the Earslm11

-

1)l~~n

had adopted this baf:dc assunption as a

Iience, the role of the Third World in the American scheme of

17
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·things has to be emphasized as an

es~;ential

element of the attempt

to reestablish a pattern of world trade which had been at the
heart of the pre-depression world order. In this context, a special interest must be applied to the role of the Latin American
economies in this revival and perpetuation of the status quo. For
several reasons 1 it would be natural to assume that the American
theories and practices in dealing with the southern part of its
own heDisphere will indicate uays and means and objectives of the
American political econor.w.
First, it was widely acknowledged that, with the exception of
Argentina, the Latin American republics had loyally and actively
contributed to the defeat of the Axis powers, had readily geared
their production to the Allied need for

expande~

imports of many

form of j_nfla ti on because of svrplus exports to the United States
in order to speed up its war production. Seymour Harris concluded
in 1944:

In short, Latin America has provided goods when they were
scarce, and it looks as though we shall return theo, at least
in part when they are more plentiful .••. In short~ in exchan~e
for vitally necessary war oaterials we have provided these
countries with paper credit, with dollars that are manufacturei
by our bankin~ system, and with gold for which they have no
use.18
A second rea~rnn for cwsuoJ.ng that

Latin American econoLlic

development would receive a benevolent attention in Washin~ton was

---

_ the general acceptance of the view that " ... a sound economic de-

of

- 61 · yelopment of Latin America is in our own interest •..• We are not
onlY paying lip service to a popular idea. 1119 It was admitted,
though, that criticism was often heard and charges were made that
the United

~.itates

does " ... not favor economic development in Latin

.America since such development would coo.pete with our own production.1120 :Out the liberal view, which dominated the State Department
throughout this period, clearly rejected such cynicism. Clayton
pointed out that '' ••• we have always had the largest trade with the
"21
.
highly deve 1 ope d coun t ries.
So far the reasoning followed the line of the peace and pros-

. peri ty concept, which Paterson has described, seein,g a "sound 11 eco-

nomic development as a means in itself to bar revolutionary politics
and

American markets through creation of an American

to expand

h-ri
YlfJ"
. -- ---<.....>

~f

and

"t

in the American definition of a

t

times replaced by "integrated" or

~ .

the peo.c-e

prosperity concept beyond the level of rhetoric, are indicated
'sound' econoo.y. This term, some11

collaborated", constituted the

t

[~
~:: ~

link bet1·;een an abstract economic theory and concrete business prac-

~;

tice. The connotations of these terms e~plain the obvious difference

in the way the peace and prosperity concept was applied to different
: areas. Highlighting ~he geopoli U_cal aspects of a r;table, liberal

19,.,c''{

4 4')c, Dec. 2 1, 1947, p. 1?15, Horf'.'lan Arf'.'lour,
Assistant 0eeretary of State.
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world-order, it reveals some of the basic assumptions of the
political economy in the literal sense of the word.
To the American policy-makers the economic cris±s of Latin
America was fundamentally different from the European. It seemed
that where Europe was threatened with collapse, the Latin American

Republics were faced with obstacles to going forward.

2

?

Truman stated

at the final session of the Hio Conference that "the problems of

countries in this Hemisphere are different in nature and cannot
be relieved by the sane means and by the same approaches which
are in contemplation for Europe." The United States had to differentiate between the urgent need for rehabilitation of war-shattered
areas and the problems of development elsewhere. 23 While it was
acknowledged that some of the Latin American states had balanceor-payment prooiews, these difficulties were essentially d1fferent from the European shortage, which arose " ... from the necessary heavy importations of food and raw materials ..•• What Latin
AILerica needs is capital goods." 24
From this difference in the stage of economic development it
followed that the need in the other American republics was for
nlong term economic collaboration." Truman explained that this was

"the type of collaboration in which a much greater ne~d falls to
22_

0.3., Department of State, Council on Foreien Relations,
_lli.iited 0tatE?_§. in ~jorld Affairs, 1947-1948, p. 136.
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ivate citizens and groups than is the case in a program designed

id Europe. 1125 Similarly, Horman Arri.our, Assistant 0ecretary
to a
~f

state, declared that the problems of Latin America pointed to

the inportance of creating satisfactory opportunity "for the for.
as well as dor:lestic investor.
eJ.gn
tant Secretary of

~tate,

1126

Spruille Braden, also Assis-

tried to convince the Latin Americans

that "sound industrialization can, by all odds: be carried out more
effectively under the dynamic system of private enterprise, to
.
d , t"i1an
which we are a l ~~ d e d icaGe
.L

i'

t ever can b e b y governmen t . 11 28

The belief in the neceusity of the use of private capital and
foreign investment was often made clear by references to the North
American experience during the 19th century. At the Bogota' Confer~~e,

Marshall invited the other Arwrican renublics to fallow this

example and try to attract foreign capital to participation in economic development. He recalled,

thou~h,

pital was invested. in the United States

that European venture ca11

•••

at first cautiously and.

often with r:lisunderstanding on both sides. 11 But he emphasize(l that
"despite the transfor~ation from debtor to creditor .•• the United
States continues to ~elcome money and technical assistance from
other couu-tries. n

Ji.:pparently the 1Jorth A:~erican hospitality to-

25_)"·-3
~,
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wa.rds foreign venture capital did not impress the Latin Americans
too much. Former president of Chile, Carlos Davila, said on another
29
occasion: "The Good Neighbor policy is also Good Business policy."
If private enterprise was one aspect of the definition of a
sound econonic development, another was the expansion of the production of primary materials. Armour said that "our government holds
the view that fuller utilization be r:ade of the resources of the
underdeveloped coUi.J.tries

in such a way that a better balance re-

sults between primary and secondary industries.

1130

The problen from

the Latin American point of view was how such a balance could be
achieved by expansion of the production of raw materials, as all
the countries south of the Rio Grande were badly in need of heavy
machinery and manufactured goods, while surplus production of raw

· World War r. 31 Armour solved this problem by ex-

ence after

plaining that " .•• careful consideration should be given to the
imcroveraent and extension of primary industries and to the proportion in which soundly based manufacturing industries should be
developed."

32

If World War II had created serious economic problems in La29 After Samuel Guy Inman, "Some latin AYlerican Views on Postwar Hcco11i::>truction," Forei.gn Affairs Her>ort, XX, March 15, 1944, p. 6.
Ho. 442, Dec. 21, 1947, p. 1215.
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tin America, it had also offered an unprecedented chance. Being cut

off from some of its traditional suppliers of manufactured goods,
a.rid with the United States preoccupied with war production, it had
been possible for "baby-industries" to develop and fill

U})

parts

of the economic vacuum. 33 Hence, after the war, the natural tenNency
a.mong Latin American states had been to try to resort to protective
tariffs to preserve these industries.

34

The capital equipment, how-

ever, had been overextended in order to meet both local and Allied
demands, and new capital goods were much needed to encounter the
revival of foreign competition. For this reason, and because of
the want of a balanced trade to halt the inflation, the problem of

a dollar shortage was rising, while considerable amounts were frozen
in sterling, except for a short period of sterling-dollar converti-

This was the situation when South America was called upon to
help fulfill the needs of western Europe through the allocations
of the Marshall Plan. As Truman put it:'

The European Recovery 1?rogram will require procure:oent of supplies in many nations of this Her;1isphere. This will act as a
stimulant to production and busineps activity and promote the
re-establishment of world trade upon which the prosperity of
us all depend.36
The La tin American republics, however, dj_d not remember the

-----

..-.

_..

in World Af_fairn, 1947-48, p. 128.
34 1''oreiim Affairs He port, XX, p. 6.
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. golden days of the pre-depression trade pattern the same way State
Department did. Neither did th~y want back the semi-colonial status,

still in recent memory, nor did they wish to expand-production of
ra.W materials beyond what normal conditions in foreign markets
37

could hold.

The Americans saw things differently. Pushing for a return to
the Triangle pattern, State Department officials repeated at the
Inter-American conferences over and over that the ERP would restore
the buying power of former customers in Europe. "It is safe to say
·that, without the restoration of these former markets, there can be
no permanent solution to the economic diffic~lties which now beset
the American republics. 11

38

Hence, it was considered in the Latin American self-interest

to support the Marshall Plan. Marshall hioself saw the EHP as a
Latin American development and he stated in

"prerequisi te 11 to

Bogota: "All that are able should contribute, all will share the
7Q

benefits. 1177 Geymour Harris, however, concluded that che non-EHP
countries 1vould face hard times. With exports up and imports down,
.
.
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",focrca:'3 the BH? goods to be nrovided bv the U.S. ( excess of export~:; over imports) i.s to be about l lf) percent of the income
of th::Ls country, the burden on t.i'lc~ economy of the other il.neri-
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cas is to be about 8 to 9 percent of their income, or about 6
to 7 times as much as for the United States •.•• In other words,
they are being asked to provide goods under the ERP in exchange
for credits or dollars; and the ·use of these dollars is to be
subject to control by the United States.41
According to contemporary evidence both from those who actively
participated in the planning and execution of the ERP, as from economic commentators, the Latin American republics we·re very much involved in the Marshall Plan, as they were assie;ned the role of contributors. The embrace of Latin America by the peace and prosperity
concept appeared to add a petspective to the Marshall Plan which reveals some of the basic premises of the program.
During the suIIlI2er and fall of 1947, the broader implications
of the Marshall Plan were formulated. The opening of the imperial
syster;is in Europe r:-iade it possible for American political economy
to formulate some of the basic atrategies for a new world-order.
An important assumption was the balance between the primary and the

secondary producing countries - a balance which was supposed to be
sustained by the authority of the United States. Although the Marshall
Plan seemed to concentrate on the European balance-of-power, it
aimed towards the establishment of an economic world-order that

.

would be congenial to the political and economic institutions of the

~~~

~~f

United States.
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Conclusion

In conclusion, the basic assunptions that shaped the policy
of the

Ma~shall

Plan, as revealed in the contemporary context, seem

to offer evidenc·e for the Williams-interpretation of the continuity
and coherence of the long-run objectives sought by the foreign policy
of the United

States~

The objectives behind the Marshall Plan were

modeled upon the traditional search fo:!.'.' expanding

ma:!.'.'l~~t::.:

- a noec

that seemed all the more urgent as the war had expanded American
productivity so tremendously. While the domestic market was considdered adequate to absorb the output in the short-run, the Truman
administration felt compelled to engage in thLs

project which from

an economic point bf view was expected botn to furnish ample markets in Europe and secure.access to cheap raw materials elsewhere.
Given the conventional explanation for the economic difficulties in the thirties, the weakness of Europe in 1947 seemed to offer a chance for revision of the trend towards state trading that
could be expected. It was openly adm.itted that" .•• if a proposal
somewhat.along the lines of HRP is not adopted we will see an emphasizing of state-controlled econor:iies all over Europe."

1

Denying

r
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'

·that capi;talism was able to survive in one country alone, the ad~inistration

took up the imperial definition of the needs for a

preservation of the

n~tional

integrity, extended this nefinition

to Europe, and connected it with the physical security interests
which had been confirmed with the military engagement during the
world War.
From an economic point of view, the ERP was expected to
strengthen the European cormni tment to the kind of manipulated market-pldce economy that seemed to be able to stabilize the economic
development in advanced industrial states. Using its economic power
to try to achieve a high degree of integration among the capitalist
industrial countries, the United States acknowledged through the
~rshall

Plan that these nations shared interests both in confron-

tation with the Soviet Union and in the antagonism with the developing countries.
Perhaps it is absurd to try to establish a list of priorities
among the different aspects of the motivation

behin~

the Marshall

Plan, because some people stressed military, while others stressed
humanitari::~n

all people;. "

or economic aspects. "The pian offered all things to
2

It seems nevertheless jm>tified to say that the eco-

nomic ob.iectives as they were conceived by the administratj_on and
framed by familiar and accepted ass1mptions of the ideology of

----

.politic al. economy, were compelling in thernselves - given the con1

Hou.Je, })ost\12r

~~;_goverv,

p. 335 .
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·- 70 cept of the needs of the .American political and economic system.

If these needs were often stated in economic terms, they had broader
implications, backed by a general consensus on the socio-economic
J

institutions of the United States. Although Marshall had once explained that he was not a businessman, he often resorted to business
terms when he explained the means and ends of foreign policy, such
as his summary of the basic assumptions behind the plan:
The ERP is a mobilization for peace, meeting the challenge of
an alien system by strengthening the hands of those nations
that believe as we do .••. We in the United States, perhaps
more than any other part of the world, believe in private entc~rprise. We are convinced that trade within our country and
between our country and other nations can best be so conducted.
And we further believe in equality of opportunity. As stated
in the Atlantic Charter, every country should have equal access
to the trade and raw materials of the world •.•. We have taken
leadership in the world in every effort to keep the~way open for
free enterprise.3
on the euonomic aspect

or

petuate a pro-American world-order, the theme of United States foreign policy in the post-war era can hardly be stated more concisely.
Paterson has definitely found a very precise name for the
thrust of American policy in the period of the Marshall Plan, and
his analysis embraces significant eleraents of the American motivation for the

lm_r.

However, his conception for ideo1oey appears to

be too narrow. As it seems, Paterson .i~plicitly makes a distinction
between uhat American policy-ma.kers thought they were do~ng and

----

lhat they actually did, a distinction between rhetoric and practice,
·.c

JNarsho.11 before ~)ubcommi ttee on Tariff and Heciprocal '1'rade
~f~the House 1/lays arnl Vica.ns Committee, May 6, 1948, printed :i.n rn;m,
V1rr, hay 16, 1948, p. 6~1-652.

r
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between idealistic thinking and harsh political realities, ideology
and action.
But the ideology of political economy behind the Marshall Plan

was not just a few simplistic principles of theblessing and necessitY of multilateral trade and of stopping Communistic advance by
prosperity. Rather, it was a coherent bloc of theory and practice
which manifested itself in the concept of revitalizing a stable
world order in which the relationship between primary and secondary
producers could be secured in a way that appeared congenial to the
socio-economic interests of the dominant strata and

~lasses

corporate capitalistic state. The argument of Paterson

in a

rests~

in the

J

last analysis,

011

the idea of ideology as something separate

form

its economic basis. Hence, he is able to point to hypocritical elemen.ts in the application of the peace

ferent parts of the world (the disregard for prospective customers
in the

developin~

countries and the non-liberal parts of the trade

policy) . Seen from such an angle, the American ideology rer:mins a
rhetorical varnish - a characteristic it would indeed share with all
theoretical formations of political thinking. Such an approach to
history tends to promote a schizophrenic conception of historical
forces.
Any reasonable understanding of the roots of

forei~n

policy

r.mst base its analysic on a clear cnnception of the relationship
between cconoffiic basis and superstructure, theory and practice.
Eugene Gcno\roue has clarified this question by a reference to the

- 72 The analysis ••• ·reinforces the notion of·an "historical bloc"
in which the material forces are the content 1 and ideologies
the form - merely an analytical distinction since material
forces would be historically inconceivable without form and
since ideologies would have to be considered individual babbling without material forces.4
A class conscious interpretation of American foreign policy,
following these lines, will consider the formulation and conduct
of foreign affairs uithin the frame of elaborate structures of theory and practice, " ••• ~ermeating the consciousness of entire epochs,
••• and

so closely related to the dominant structures of produc-

tion that the relationship is no longer a matter for conscious reflect ion." 5
Hence, the important thing about the Marshall Plan is not so
much that some businessmen and some State Department officials of
policy-makers said something and did something else. Neither is it
overall important that different economic groups, located on different stages of production or geographically separated, competed
among themselves for direct influence in the decision-making process, "s.uperficially appearing as interest groups rather than as a
unified class."

The important fact (with consequences for the un-

derstanding of the past as for the prese·nt) is:
••• fWl hat kind of socioeconomic. framework they all wish to
compete within, and the relationship between themselves and
the rest of society in a manner that defines their vital function as a class •••• That they disagree on the options is less

4Eugene Genovese, "Marxian Interpretations of the Slave South","
in Barton J. Bernstein, ed., Towards !! .New Past:: .Dissenting Essa vs
1:g American History, (New York, 1969), p. 98.
5Chis'topher Lasch, The Agony of the Af.lerican kf.!., (New York,
1966) , p. 8. .

.
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consequential than that they circumscribe the political universe.6
This paper has argued. that the econor:iic situation in the United
States offered other possibilities in the spring of 1947, than those
described by 1·iilliams, - prospects which can be clarified by a distinction between short and long term considerations of the objectives
of the foreign policy. Furthermore, it seems that the administration
should not be mistaken for groups, who feared an imminent recession.
However, these poin"Gs of view have been established in order to confirm and attempt to

de~elop

the view that

American diplomacy,

through the policy of the Harshall Plan, reflected the demands of
a corporate capitalistic system, confronted with econoBic and social
challenges at home and abroad.

the pluralistic pattern of business interests but from the way these
interests have been able to dominate the definition of the American
destiny.
Niels Thorsen

6

Kolko, Eootf>, p. G.
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